Nowadays many employers offer their employees the possibility of an insurance against too large losses in income when retiring or becoming disabled. This paper models the optimization problem of the employer when setting up such a so-called pension fund. not surprisingly, it turns out that the optimal solution depends on the premium the employees are willing to pay at most for the insurance. Since this is private information for an employee and hence not known to the employer, he needs to collect information regarding these maximum premiums. It is shown that in most cases the employer is unable to perfectly inform himself on these maximum premiums. So, he cannot create the right incentives for his employees to reveal their maximum premiums truthfully.
Introduction
Because of the growing population of elder people, social systems in many western European countries experience difficulties in guaranteeing an adequate income after retirement or disability. Especially those people with a higher income would experience a considerable loss of income when retiring or becoming disabled. Insurance companies anticipated this situation by developing several new products which insure people of an income of, say, 90 of their present income in case of disability, or an additional income above the pension supplied by the social system after retirement.
Employers on the other hand have to pay social premiums on the salaries paid to their employees. In the past decade, these premiums have gradually increased, and consequently, employers continuously look for other means to compensate their employees so as to pay less social premiums. A solution popular to many employers is creating a so-called 'pension fund' which, as the insurance companies do, insures employees against an excessive loss of income.
The difference, however, is the fact that this fund is not an insurance company, but completely belongs to the employer's firm, who benefits from this construction due to a decreasing amount of social premiums that have to be paid.
In this paper we analyze the employer's decision problem with respect to the format of such a pension fund. To cover the future claims of the participating employees the employer establishes a pension fund. In our model we assume that any differences between the total sum of realized claims and the pension fund's total capital do not contribute to the employer's profit/loss. So, if the total of realized claims turns out to be lower than the pension fund's capital, then the profits of the employer do not increase. Similarly, if the total of realized claims turn out to be higher then the profits of the employer do not decrease. This means that the employer only benefits from the pension fund through a decrease in the social premiums that have to be paid. The pension fund, however, must be such that the probability that the total claims exceed the available capital is sufficiently low. So, roughly speaking, the employer's objective is to maximize the reduction in social premiums that have to be paid, subject to the earlier mentioned solvability constraint. This paper focuses attention on the determination of the optimal insurance premium.
This premium is the same for all insured employees. So, the employer is not allowed to discriminate between his employees. Reason for this assumption is that in some countrie,
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The Netherlands for example, price discrimination in this regard is illegal. For determining this insurance premium the employer lacks some vital information, namely, how much the employees want to pay at most for this insurance. In order to get this information the employer could simply ask each of his employees to tell him what insurance premium he wants to pay at maximum. Then, given this information, he could determine the optimal insurance premium.
Acting in this way the employer implicitly assumes that his employees are honest and truthfully reveal their maximum premiums. The possibility of any strategic behavior by the employees is undeservingly ignored. The employees, however, could induce a lower insurance premium by not reporting the true maximum premium but another, lower one. Consequently, the employer would charge a lower premium than he would have charged in the optimum, resulting in less than optimal profits. Summarizing, it is not as much the determination of the optimal insurance premium that poses any problems to the employer, but the acquisition of the correct information. To answer the question whether it is indeed possible for the employer to get the correct information or not we turn to implementation theory.
For surveys on implementation theory the reader is referred to Moore (1992) and Palfrey (1992) . Now, let us try to explain what implementation theory is all about. Consider the employer and his employees and suppose that i is the true maximum premium of employee i. If the employer exactly knows these premiums, he can determine the optimal premium . Unfortunately he will not exactly know the premiums i in advance, so he cannot determine this optimal solution . Instead, he can design a mechanism (or game) in which the employees participate, that yields him some information regarding these maximum premiums i the employees are willing to pay. Based on this (possibly biased) information he can solve his optimization problem resulting in a premium . The problem is called implementable if the employer can design a game such that the outcome of this game coincides with the optimal outcome . The interpretation is that the employer gets perfectly informed on the maximum premiums when applying this specific game, since the outcome of this game coincides with the outcome that the employer would have chosen if he knew the maximum premiums beforehand. Summarizing, the employer's decision problem is implementable if he can construct a mechanism for which the outcomes coincide with the outcomes that are optimal from his point of view.
Unfortunately for the employer, it is shown that under rather weak conditions the em-ployer's decision problem is not implementable. This means that there exists no mechanism, how clever or complex it may be designed, that provides the employer with the information he needs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 then states the Bayesian implementation framework. Furthermore, it is shown that the employer's decision problem is not Bayesian implementable. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
The Model
We start with explaining the model in the context of pension funds, that is, insurances that guarantee employees of a sufficiently high income after retirement. Then we show that by changing the meaning of some of the variables, this model also applies for disability insurances that guarantee employees of a sufficiently high income once they become disabled.
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; n gbe the set of employees and denote the employer by E. The employer and the employees are assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers with utility functions u i and u E , respectively. Next, let t = 1 denote the starting year of the pension fund. Define for each employee i 2 N N i the remaining lifetime of employee i; P i the year in which employee i plans to retire; w it the wage of employee i in year t, w it 0; y it the pension provided by the government to employee i in year t, y it 0; E it the additional pension payments in year t for which employee i can take an insurance.
It is assumed that both death and retirement occur at the end of a year. Furthermore, we introduce tax rate on income, t 2 0; 1; g the social security premiums that have to be paid by the employer, expressed as a percentage of the employees' wages; discount rate, 2 0; 1 .
Note that the remaining lifetime N i of employee i is a random variable and that P i and E it may be random variables 1 . Also note that wages and pension payments may vary over the years.
Furthermore, let T be the year for which all employees have deceased with probability one. So, the time span that is considered covers the period from t = 1 to t = T. Next, we assume that pension/insurance premiums can be expressed as a percentage of the employee's wage w it .
Moreover, since it is illegal -at least in The Netherlands -for the employer to discriminate between his employees with respect to the insurance premium, each employee that participates in the pension fund pays the same percentage of his wage as insurance premium. Insurance companies operating on the market, however, are allowed to discriminate between the premiums that individuals have to pay for an insurance. Now suppose that the employer organizes a pension fund for his employees and that the premium equals a percentage 2 0; 1 of the wage. Then employee i 2 N has three different actions at his disposal.
First, he can decide to take no insurance at all. Then his payoff in year t equals 1, w it if employee i is still working in year t, 1 , y it if employee i is retired in year t, and zero if employee i is no longer alive in year t. Thus, employee i's discounted payoff over the period of T years equals (1) where the latter sum equals zero if P i + 1 N i .
Second, employee i can decide to insure his income after retirement at an existing insurance company. Then his payoff in year t equals 1 , w it , m i w it if employee i is still working in year t. Note that the premium m i w it employee i pays in year t is a percentage m i of his wage and that it may depend on i. 
Out of the three options considered above, employee i chooses the one that maximizes his expected utility. Moreover, taking the premiums charged by the existing insurance companies as given, employee i can determine the maximum premium he is willing to pay at most for participation in the pension fund. Let i denote employee i's maximum premium. Then without loss of generality we may assume that 1 2 : : : n .
Given these maximum premiums i we can consider the employer's decision problem.
First, of course, the employer has to decide whether or not he starts a pension fund for his employees. If he decides to do so, then he has to determine the premium that the employees have to pay for participating in the pension fund. Furthermore, he has to decide how much he contributes himself to the pension fund's capital every year. This contribution in year t is denoted by c t 2 I R. An incentive for the employer to contribute to the pension fund is the following. The contributions c t enable the employer to lower the premium, possibly resulting in more employees participating in the pension fund, which yields that less social premiums have to be paid. Hence, the benefits of the employer may increase.
Suppose the employer does not organize a pension fund for his employees. In that case his payoff in year t equals , P n i=1 P minP i ;N i t=1 1 + gw it , that is, the wages he has to pay to his employees plus the social premiums. 
There are, however, solvability constraints on the pension fund's capital that have to be satisfied. For each year t the probability that the total amount of money claimed thus far exceeds the available capital must be sufficiently small. The total discounted claims up to year
and the available capital up to year t equals
Note that both the claims and the available capital are random variables. The solvability constraints then read as follows,
for t = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; Tand sufficiently small, e.g., = 0 : 05. Summarizing, the employer chooses and c t t = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; T such that his expected utility is maximal given that the solvability restrictions of (5) are satisfied. So, the employer's decision problem can be stated as follows, 
Note that if the resulting expected utility is less than the utility level corresponding to organizing no pension fond, then the employer does, of course, not establish a pension fund for his employees.
Next, let us take a closer look at the employer's decision problem. To start with the solvability constraints, note that probability distribution functions are continuous from the right. So, given a premium there exists a contribution c 1 of the employer such that the solvability constraint for t = 1 is satisfied in equality, that is,
and
for all x c 1 . Thus, if is the premium then c 1 is the optimal contribution in year t = 1 of the employer to the pension fund's capital. In a similar way, one can calculate the optimal contributions c t for the years t = 2 ; 3 ; : : : ; T . So, the employer's optimization problem can be written as
Next, we show that in the optimum the premium can be chosen equal to the maximum premium i of some employee i. For this purpose, let be a premium such that 6 = i for all i = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n . Furthermore, let m = m be the number of insured employees if the premium equals . The employer can (weakly) increase his expected utility by setting the premium equal to m , the premium that employee m is willing to pay at most for the insurance.
To see this, first note that m . This implies that the payoff , P m i=1
stochastically dominates 2 the payoff , P m i=1
2 Let X and Y be random variables. X stochastically dominates Y if I PX x I PY x for all x 2 I R.
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for all x 2 I R, which implies that P T t=1 t c t m P T t=1 t c t . Then the fact that pay-
Since the payoff corresponding to a premium can be (weakly) improved by setting the premium equal to m , an optimal premium can be found among the maximum premiums i , i = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n . So, instead of deciding what premium to charge he can decide on how many employees he wants to insure. If he wants to insure exactly m employees, he sets the premium equal to m . Note, however, that some values of m are excluded if several maximum premiums coincide. For example, if m = m+1 then it is not possible for the employer to insure exactly m employees. For setting the premium equal to m yields m+1insured employees. Formally, this means that the employer can only choose among those m for which m m+1 . Let D denote this domain, i.e., D = fm 2 f 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n gj m m+1 g f 0 g :
Note that we have also included m = 0 , so that organizing no pension fund is also incorporated as a possibility. Exchanging the decision variable for m in the employer's decision problem then yields
Remark that the employer's constrained optimization problem has now been reduced to an unconstrained optimization problem over a finite number of possibilities.
The problem considered thus far is concerned with the insurance of an (additional) income after retirement. Now, by changing the meanings of the variables N i and P i , this model 9 also describes the insurance of an (additional) income when an employer becomes disabled.
For this, define for each employee i N i the year in which the insurance payments to employee i end. This, for example, happens when employee i dies or when he reaches the retirement age, in which case he receives a pension from the government.;
P i the year in which employee i becomes disabled;
w it the wage of employee i in year t, w it 0;
y it the payments provided by the government to employee i in year t, y it 0;
E it the additional income in year t for which employee i can take an insurance;
So, an employee pays premiums for the insurance from t = 1 to t = minP i ; N i , and he receives payments from this insurance from t = P i + 1 till t = N i . Note that these are the same time periods that occur in the model on pensions. Thus the problem formulated in (8) also applies if the insurance provided by the employer concerns the disability of an employee.
Both insurance problems assume that the employer is perfectly informed on the maximum premiums i of the employees. Given these maximum premiums he can determine the optimal solution m of (8), and subsequently he can offer his employees to participate in the pension fund for a premium m . In reality, however, it is unlikely that an employer is completely informed on the maximum premiums i his employees are willing to pay for an insurance.
Indeed, this maximum premium is private information for the employee and not known to his colleagues or his employer.
Since the employer has incomplete knowledge of the maximum premiums i of his employees, he is not able to solve the optimization problem formulated in (8). To get information on these maximum premiums, the employer could approach each of his employees and ask them to reveal their maximum premiums. Subseqeuntly, he could determine the optimal solution as described above and announce the premium to his employees. Obtaining information in this way, however, has the drawback that employees have incentives to misreport their maximum premiums. More precisely, employees have a tendency to reveal lower maximum premiums than the true ones. As a result, the inaccurate information used by the employer results in a premium that is not optimal for him. Arises the question whether there is some other way for the employer to obtain the information he needs. This question is dealt with in the next section.
The Implementation Problem
Acquiring the correct information in order to determine the optimal premium from the employer's point of view is known in the literature as an implementation problem. To be more specific, since employees only have information on their own maximum premium i and not on the maximum premiums of the other employees, it is a Bayesian implementation problem.
Before we take a more general approach to Bayesian implementation let us elaborate on the situation described at the end of the previous section: the situation where each employee was asked to report his maximum premium.
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; n g denote the set of employees. The maximum premium i employee i is willing to pay is determined by his utility function u i . So the fact that the employer does not know employee i's maximum premium implies that he also does not know his utility function. Furthermore, employee i only knows his own utility function and not the utility functions of all the other employees. Let u = u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : ; u n denote the vector of utility functions. Such a vector u is called the state of the world. Recall that the employer has no knowledge about the state u of utility functions and that employee i only has partial knowledge of the state u, namely, his own utility function u i . Furthermore, since employees were assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers the set of all possible utility functions for employee i equals U i = fu i : I R ! I R j u i is strictly increasing and concaveg; and the set of all possible state of the world equals U = U 1 U 2 : : : U n .
To get some information on the true state of the world the employer asks his employees to reveal their utility functions. Suppose that u = u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : ; u n denotes the true state of the world and thatû = u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : ; u n denotes the reported state of the world. Given the reported utility functionsû i , the employer can use expression (3) to determine the maximum premium û i each employee is willing to pay for the insurance. Subsequently, he uses these maximum premiums to solve his optimization problem formulated in (8), yielding an optimal premium ûthat depends on the reported utility functionsû = u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : ; u n . Then the employer rules that employees have to participate in the pension fund if the premium ûcharged by the employer is less than or equal to the reported maximum premium û i . Employees are not allowed to participate if the premium ûexceeds the reported maximum premium.
Moreover, the employees know beforehand that this rule applies. So, they can take this into account when deciding which utility function to reveal. At first sight this rule might seem a bit restrictive compared to the more realistic case where the employees may decide themselves whether or not they want to participate in the pension fund when the premium equals û.
We will show later on though, that for our main result it does not matter which of the two rules apply.
Given the premium ûemployee i participates in the pension fund if û i û, yielding the payoff (cf. (3) depending on which of the two outside options employee i prefers most, that is, no insurance or insurance with an existing insurance company (cf. (1) and (2)).
Let h i ûdenote the payoff to employee i whenû is the reported state of the world and let h û = h 1 û; h 2 û; : : : ; h n û. The expected utility for employee i then equals Eu i h i û. Note that the payoff h i ûis evaluated by his true utility function u i . Since h i ûdepends onû i employee i can influence the outcome by reporting another utility function.
Which utility function he reports depends on the strategy he plays.
A strategy i for employee i indicates which utility function is reported given the true utility function. Formally, this means that i is a map assigning to each utility function u i 2 U i another utility functionû i 2 U i , with the interpretation that if u i represents employee i's true utility function then he reports the utility functionû i . For example, the strategy that always reports the true utility function is represented by i u i = u i for all u i 2 U i .
Given the strategies = 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n of all employees and the true state of the world u the payoff to employee i equals h i u, where u = 1 u 1 ; 2 u 2 ; : : : ; n u n .
The corresponding expected utility then equals Eu i h i u. Determining this expected utility, however, is impossible considering the fact that employee i does not completely know the state u. In fact, he only knows his own utility function u i . To circumvent this problem, each employee i has beliefs about the true state u. These beliefs are represented by a prior probability measure i u i on U ,i = j 6 = i U j and may depend on the true utility function u i of employee i. The expected utility of employee i is then given by Z The payoff function h is called incentive compatible if reporting the true utility function is a Bayesian equilibrium. Substituting in (9) that reporting the truth is the strategy u = u for all u 2 U and that^ i u i = u i for someû i 2 U i implies that h is incentive compatible if Summarizing, if h is incentive compatible then revealing the true utility functions is a Bayesian equilibrium. This means from an equilibrium point of view that the employer becomes correctly informed on the true utility functions and, consequently, that he charges the optimal 13 insurance premium that yields him maximal benefits. The next theorem, however, shows that under some conditions the payoff function h does not satisfy incentive compatibility. Hence, the employer can not expect to get perfect information on the true utility functions.
To specify the conditions take i 2 N and u i 2 U i . Let ,i I R n,1 be the set of all possible maximum premiums u ,i = u j j6 =i . Thus, ,i = fu ,i ju ,i 2 U ,i g:
Next, let B be a Borel set in ,i and define the set V B U ,i by V B = f u , i 2 U , i j u , i 2 B g ;
as the set of all utility functions u ,i of the other employees such that the corresponding vector of maximum premiums belongs to B. The condition is satisfied for sure if there exists an employee i and a utility function u i such that the density function corresponding to this employee's prior probability measure i u i is strictly positive. Since the payoff function h is not incentive compatible, the employer cannot get the information he needs by just asking his employees. This is, however, only one way to get information. The employer could, of course, design other methods to receive information on the maximum premiums of his employees. These other methods are described by so-called mechanisms.
A mechanism is a pair A; , where A = A 1 A 2 : : : A n with A i the action space of employee i and the payoff function, assigning to each action a 2 A a (stochastic) payoff to each employee. For example, in the previously described mechanism where each employee reports his utility function, an action for employee i consists of reporting a utility function. This implies that A i = U i for all i 2 N and that A = U. Furthermore, the payoff function is described by h , i.e., a = h a for all a 2 A.
Similar to the mechanism U; h we can define strategies for employee i in a mechanism A; . A strategy for employee i is a map i : U i ! A i with the interpretation that employee i takes action i u i 2 A i if u i is his true utility function.
Given the strategies of all employees, the payoff to employee i equals i u if u is the vector of true utility functions. The expected payoff to employee i then equals Z Now, consider again the problem from the employer's point of view. If u 2 U are the true utility functions then he would like the payoffs to the employees to be equal to h u, since this corresponds to maximal benefits for the employer. To be sure that his benefits are maximal for each possible state u, the employer has to design the mechanism A; in such a way that every Bayesian equilibrium yields him the payoff u = h u for all u 2 U.
If he can indeed construct such a mechanism then the payoff function h is called Bayesian implementable.
Similar to Bayesian implementation with a finite number of states of the world (see Jackson (1991) ) one can easily show that incentive compatibility as formulated in (10) is a necessary condition or h to be Bayesian implementable. To see this, suppose that h is Bayesian implementable but not incentive compatible. Then some employee i is better off in the revelation mechanism U; h by pretending that someû i is his true utility function instead of his true utility function u i . But since each Bayesian equilibrium in the mechanism A; yields him the payoff i u = h i u he could improve his payoff in this same mechanism A; by acting as ifû i is his utility function instead of u i , that is, take the action i û i instead of i u i . Obviously, this contradicts the fact that is a Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, the payoff function h must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Theorem 3.1 showed that under rather weak conditions, the payoff function h does not satisfy the incentive compatibility property. This implies that h is also not Bayesian implementable. Thus there exists no mechanism, how complex or clever it may be designed, that gives the employer the correct information regarding the utility functions of his employees.
Remarks
Theorem 3.1 tells us that under some conditions the employer is not able to perfectly inform himself on the maximum premiums of his employees. Recall that the payoff function desired by the employer was chosen in such a way that employees can only participate in the pension fund if the maximum premium they report does not exceed the premium set by the employer.
So, in fact, the employer decided whether an employee got the insurance or not. As already mentioned, a natural (and maybe more realistic) adjustment of this payoff function is to let the employees decide whether they want to participate or not. So, given the information revealed by the employees, the employer sets an insurance premium and each employee decides individually if he participates or not. This payoff function, however, does also not satisfy the incentive compatibility property. This can easily be seen as follows. Suppose that it did satisfy incentive compatibility. Then revealing the true utility function would be a Bayesian equilibrium. But if each employee reveals his true utility function then it does not matter whether the employer decides on the participation of an employee in the pension fund, or the employee himself decides this. So if the adjusted payoff function satisfies incentive compatibility, then so does the original payoff function. Since the latter is not true, the adjusted payoff function can not be incentive compatible.
In proving the impossibility theorem we have put no restrictions on the set of possible utility functions U i . So U i contains any strictly increasing and concave utility function. This guarantees that for any 'reasonable' insurance premium there exists a utility function such that the corresponding maximum premium equals the aforementioned insurance premium.
In this context, reasonable means that the premium should be at least the expected loss of income. This is due to the risk averse behavior of the employees. Furthermore, the premium should not exceed the maximum amount that theoretically can be received from the insurance.
Taking this notion of reasonability into account, it is not difficult to see that Theorem 3.1 still holds if the set of utility functions U i is restricted in such a way, that for every 'reasonable' insurance premium there still exists a utility function in U i for which the corresponding maximum premium equals this insurance premium. An example of such a restricted U i is U i = fu i t = , e , a i t ; t2I R j a i 0 g . An incidental benefit in this case is that the beliefs of employee i on the utility functions of the remaining employees can be described by a probability distribution on a ,i , i.e., the parameters that determine the utility functions of the other employees. Furthermore, the condition formulated in Theorem 3.1 holds for any continuous probability distribution on a ,i with strictly positive density function.
The overall consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that there is no need for the employer to organize a (complex) mechanism to acquire information when setting up a pension fund for his employees, since all the information revealed by the employees cannot be rated at its true value.
The alternatives left for the employer are either to get the information elsewhere (if possible) or to set an insurance premium independent of the information revealed by the employees. for the actual height of the premium the employer could use the market premium as an indication.
Finally, it should be noted that a mechanism A; includes many ways of collecting information on the maximum premiums of the employees. For example, by introducing individual taxes the employer can discriminate between individual employees. Although such a mechanism is illegal in our model, the main result does not change if it would be allowed.
So, even if the employer is allowed to discriminate between his employees, he can not get perfectly informed on the maximum premiums.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1
The outline of the proof is as follows. To show our main result we only consider deviations by employees to utility functions yielding a lower maximum premium. This turns out to be sufficient to show that h is not incentive compatible. The proof consists of five parts. In the first part of the proof we examine how the premium changes when an employee deviates from revealing his true utility function. The second part focuses on the cases for which deviating decreases the expected utility of an employee, while the third part considers the cases for which deviating increases his expected utility. In the fourth part of the proof we deduce a necessary condition on h to satisfy incentive compatibility. The fifth and final part then shows that this necessary condition cannot be satisfied.
Throughout this proof let the true utility function u i of employee i be fixed and let u i denote the maximum premium corresponding to u i . Furthermore, let ûdenote the optimal premium set by the employer when utility functionsû are revealed. Finally, we make the following assumptions. First, all employees are identical. So, N i , P i , w it , y it , and E it do not depend on i. Second, since fx 2 I R n jx i = u i ; 9 j2N : x j = u i g is a set with Lebesgue measure zero, it follows that fû ,i 2 U ,i j9 j2N : û j = u i g has probability measure zero with respect to i u i . Hence, we can restrict our attention tô U = fû 2 Uj8 j;i2N : û j 6 =u i g:
So, in every state of the world no two employees can have the same maximum premium. Third, we assume that if an employee deviates then he reports a utility function with a lower maximum premium than the one corresponding to his true utility function.
Let us start with examining how the premium changes when employee i revealsû i instead of his true utility function u i . Note that by assumption u i û i . Consider u ,i 2Û ,i and let m ũdenote the m-highest maximum premium whenũ are the reported utility functions, i.e., 1 ũ 2 ũ: : : n ũ. The employer's optimization problem formulated in (8) can be written as To see how the premium changes when employee i reveals the utility functionû i instead of u i , we distinguish three cases, namely, u i u i ; u , i , u i u i ; u , i , and u i = u i ; u , i . These cases are graphically presented in Figure 1 on page
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. In each graph the height of a bar represents the maximum premium that is reported by an employee. Note that the employees are placed in decreasing order with respect to the reported maximum premium.
Case 1:
In this situation we have that u i u i ; u , i . So, employee i does not get an insurance from the employer. Now, suppose that employee i reports a utility functionû i with û i u i . Note that if the employer charges the premium u i ;û ,i then his expected utility is the same in both of the reported states of the world u i ;û ,i and û i ;û ,i .
If u i û i û j with j as depicted in Case 1 of Figure 1 , then the optimal solution of (12) does not change, that is, û i ;û ,i = u i ; u , i . Indeed, the only case for which the value of the objective function in (12) changes is when the employer sets the premium equal to m û i ;û ,i = û i . Since û i u i , this change is negative.
If û j û i û k with j and k as depicted in Case 1 of Figure 1 , then the optimal solution can change. In this case the value of the objective function changes when the employer charges the premium m û i ;û ,i = û i or m û i ;û ,i = û j . The first, however, cannot be optimal. To see this, consider the following two states, u i ;û ,i and û i ;û ,i . If the employer charges the premium û j in state u i ;û ,i and û i in state û i ;û ,i , then the same set of employees get the insurance. Since u i û j this means that the employer's expected utility is higher in state u i ;û ,i than in state û i ;û ,i . So, if û j would be the optimal premium in state û i ;û ,i then charging the premium û i yields a higher expected utility than charging u i ;û ,i . But then charging u i in state u i ;û ,i must also yield a higher expected utility than u i ;û ,i . This contradicts the optimality of u i ;û ,i in state u i ;û ,i . Hence, û i cannot be optimal. A similar argument holds if the employer charges the premium û j . So, for the optimal premium û i ;û ,i we have that û i ;û ,i = u i ; u , i . Moreover, since û i û i ;û ,i it follows that employee i does not participate in the pension fund.
If hu i û k than it follows from the same argument as above that û i û i ;û ,i = u i ; u , i .
Summarizing Case 1, if u i u i ; u , i then û i û i ;û ,i if û i u i . So, if employee i is not allowed to partcipate in the pension fund when he reveals his true utility function u i , then he also is not allowed to participate when he reports a utility function u i with a lower maximum premium û i u i . Case 2: In the second situation, that is, u i u i ; u , i , we have that employee i gets the insurance from his employer. Again, suppose that employee i reports a utility functionû i with û i u i .
If u For if û i is optimal in state û i ;û ,i then û j must be optimal in state u i ;û ,i , which contradicts the optimality of u i ;û ,i . A similar argument holds if the premium equals û j . Thus, for the optimal premium û i ;û ,i we have that û i ;û ,i = u i ; u , i .
If u i ;û ,i û i û k then by the same argument as above it follows that û i ;û ,i = u i ; u , i .
Summarizing Case 2, if u i ;û ,i u i then û i ;û ,i = u i ; u , i for allû i satisfying u i ;û ,i û i u i . This means that employee i still participates in the pension fund if he reports a maximum premium of at least u i ;û ,i and at most u i . Case 3: In the third and final case we have that u i = u i ; u , i . Suppose employee i steadily decreases his reported maximum premium and let ũ i u i be the first utility function for which ũ i 6 = ũ i ;û i . Then either ũ i ũ i ;û ,i or ũ i ũ i ;û ,i .
If the first possibility occurs, we know from Case 1 that û i û i ;û ,i for allû i with û i ũ i . If the latter possibility occurs then Case 2 applies. This means that û i ;û ,i = ũ i ;û i for allû i satisfying ũ i ;û ,i û i ũ i . Summarizing Case 3, if the premium increases due to the fact employee i reports another, lower maximum premium û i , then this implies that employee i does not get any insurance when reporting û i , that is, û i û i ;û ,i . Now let us start with the second part of the proof. If the expected utility of employee i decreases when he reportsû i instead of u i then one of the following two possibility applies: either he gets the insurance for a higher premium, or he gets the insurance when reporting u i whereas he does not get it when reportingû i .
Let us begin with the first possibility, that is, he can still participate in the pension fund but for a higher premium. This means that u i u i ;û ,i , û i û i ;û ,i , and u i ;û ,i û i ;û ,i . Since employee i gets the insurance when reporting u i the cases 2 and 3 of Figure 1 apply. From the first part of this proof follows that, if u i u i ;û ,i and the optimal premium increases when û i is reported instead of u i then û i û i ;û ,i . This implies that employee i cannot partcipate in the pension fund. Hence, the case that employee i participates for a higher premium when deviating cannot occur.
The only possibility left for which the expected utility of employee i decreases is, if he gets the insurance when reporting u i whereas he does not get it when reportingû i . This means that u i ;û ,i u i and û i ;û ,i û i . Lû i = f u , i 2 U , i j u i ; u , i u i and û i ;û ,i û i g;
as the set of allû ,i for which revealingû i instead of u i strictly decreases the expected utility.
Recall from the first part of the proof that u i ;û ,i û i for allû ,i 2 Lû i .
For the third of the proof let us focus on the case that the expected utility increases. This is the case when either employee i participates in the pension fund for a lower premium, or employee i participates when reportingû i whereas he cannot participate when reporting u i . Let us start with the latter possibility. This implies that û i ;û ,i û i u i u i ;û ,i . Since u i u i ; u , i Case 1 applies. From the first part of the proof we know that if u i u i ; u , i and û i u i then also û i û i ;û ,i . So, employee i can also not participate in the pension fund when he reportsû i . Thus, the case that employee i does not participate in the pension fund when reporting u i but does participate when reportinĝ u i cannot occur.
The remaining possibility is the one where employee i gets the insurance for a lower premium. Thus, û i ;û ,i û i , u i ;û ,i u i , and û i ;û ,i u i ; u , i . In fact, to show that h is not incentive compatible it is sufficient to consider only those cases where û i ;û ,i û i u i = u i ; u , i . Let Wû i denote the set of allû ,i satisfying this condition, that is,
Then the expected utility of employee i increases when reportingû i instead of u i ifû ,i 2 Wû i . Moreover, since u i ;û ,i = u i it holds that Eu i h i u i ;û ,i = u i for allû ,i 2 Wû i . For the fifth and final step of the proof we need the following two lemmas. The first lemma shows that Lû i is decreasing in û i . The second lemma shows that Wû i is increasing in û i . Consequently, h is not incentive compatible if we can show that i u i W 0.
In order to show that i u i W 0 for some i 2 N, takeû 2 U such that û j 6 =û k for all j; k 2 N with j 6 = k and such that the optimum premium û is unique. Take i 2 N such that û i = û. So, û i is the premium charged by the employer. Since û j 6 =û k for all j; k 2 N with j 6 = k, there exists a utility function u i 2 U i satisfying (i) u i ;û ,i = u i , that is, u i is the premium that the employer charges for the insurance when employee i reveals u i instead ofû i ;
(ii) u i û i ;
(iii) for all j 2 N with û j û i it holds that û j u i .
Thus the maximum premium u i is chosen such that it is slightly greater than û i and such that u i is still optimal in state u i ;û ,i . So, we have that û i ;û ,i = û i and u i ;û ,i = u i . Now, suppose that u i is employee i's true utility function and that the other employees reportû ,i . Since the premium decreases from u i to û i if employee i revealsû i instead of u i , employee i benefits from deviating. Hence,û ,i 2 Wû i .
Next, consider employee j 6 = i and let employee i report u i . If û j u i then u i is still optimal if employee j reports any utility function v j satisfying u i v j û j . If u i û j then u i is still optimal if employee j reports any utility function v j satisfying v j û j . The same result holds if employee i reportsû i .
Since employee j is risk averse we have that the maximum premium v j has some lower bound l j , for example, the maximum premium he would be willing to pay as a risk neutral employee. Define FIGURE 1: The relation between the reported premium and the optimal premium. 27
